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OPTIMIZATION OF PARAMETERS OF A REINSURANCE AGREEMENT IN NON-
LIFE INSURANCE 
The primary purpose of this thesis is to determine the methodologies of composing the 
optimal risk transfer mechanism from the direct insurer's point of view. The study aims to 
investigate reinsurance optimization approaches developed by the actuarial science with an 
emphasis on the derivation of mathematical formulation of the retention level, being a prior 
parameter of the reinsurance agreement. The application of derived techniques to quota share 
and excess of loss reinsurance treaties is discussed. Since it is usually admitted that 
reinsurance should ensure cedent’s financial stability, the simulation model is composed to 
link the direct insurer’s risk process and reinsurance parameter in order to analyze the effects 
of examined optimization methodologies on the insurer’s general financial performance. 
Consequently, the conclusions based on obtained simulation results are provided.  
Key terms: non-life insurance, reinsurance, insurance agreements, optimization 
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EDASIKINDLUSTUSLEPINGU PARAMEETRITE OPTIMEERIMINE 
KAHJUKINDLUSTUSES 
Magistritöö uurib edasikindlustust ja sellega seotud probleeme kahjukindlustuses. Täpsemalt 
keskendutakse esmase kindlustaja põhiküsimustele edasikindlustega seoses: mis tüüpi 
edasikindlustusleping valida ja millised peaksid olema selle lepingu sobivaimad parameetrid 
esmase kindlustaja seisukohast. Töö esimeses osa tutvustatakse lugejale edasikindlustuse 
valdkonda üldiselt (taust, kontseptsioon, tüübid, juriidilised küsimused), teises osas 
kirjeldatakse matemaatiline mudel ning optimiseerimisülesanne esmase kindlustaja jaoks 
kasutades kahte lähenemist: kasulikkusfunktsiooni maksimeerimine ja kasumi hajuvuse 
minimeerimine. Mõlema lähenemise korral vaadeldakse eraldi proportsionaalseid ja 
mitteproportsionaalseid edasikindlustuslepinguid. Töö teises osas rakendatakse vaadeldud 
meetodeid simuleeritud andmetele, võrreldakse erinevate edasikindlustuslepingute ja nende 
parameetrite mõju ning kirjeldatakse iga edasikindlustusmeetodi korral parameetrite 
muutmisega kaasnevat dünaamikat. 
Märksõnad: kahjukindlustus, edasikindlustus, kindlustuslepingud, optimeerimine 
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INTRODUCTION 
The reinsurance activity can be viewed as a specific risk transfer operation, aiming to protect 
the insurance company against unpredictable losses and ensure its financial soundness.  
However, while setting as a goal a risk assurance of the company successfulness of 
reinsurance operations depends greatly on the reasonableness of the parameters stipulated by 
the contract. The principal determinant in this aspect is the retention level as the share of 
initial risk, which the ceding company keeps for its own account. Since the retention rate 
appears to influence the insurance company's performance in general, the problem of 
determining of the optimal retention level as a principal parameter of the reinsurance 
agreement gave a rise to numerous discussions over last years.  
The evaluation of the optimal amount of risk retained within direct insurer’s responsibility is a 
complex problem. As a part of overall insurance or in particular reinsurance politics, the 
estimate of the retention level should contribute to the general goals set by the company, 
however, being a subject to various specific criteria, the retention should be determined 
according to them. Hence, the reinsurance optimization techniques developed by actuarial 
science appeal to parameters and measures of general cedent’s activity, setting them as a final 
target that should be fulfilled after implementation of the given retention estimation 
methodology. These goals defined by various techniques are commonly formulated in terms 
of a positive outcome resulting from setting of reinsurance contract with certain optimization 
approach applied and consequently the investigation of the optimization possibilities and 
derivation of retention level estimates will be performed with respect to maximization of the 
positive outcome.  
Nevertheless, the implementation of the retention parameter results in a broad scope of 
possible consequences. The connection between the company’s risk process and retention 
level defined by the chosen optimization technique is of the principal importance in this 
aspect. As a mechanism of risk reduction reinsurance is supposed to minimize expected 
insurer’s losses, however this pattern of impact does not necessarily hold. Therefore, the 
analysis of examined methodologies will be accomplished with the investigation of the 
alterations in the behavior of the cedent’s risk process in cases when different types of 
reinsurance agreements with retention parameters estimated by examined approaches are 
applied.  Consequently, the investigation of optimization methodologies will include both 
theoretical derivation of retention level estimates and practical evaluation of reasonableness of 
implementation of given methodologies from the perspective of supporting the cedent’s 
solvency and financial stability.  
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1. THE REINSURANCE ACTIVITY: THE ESSENCE, PURPOSE AND MAIN 
TYPES OF AGREEMENTS 
1.1.  The Concept of Reinsurance 
The reinsurance as a specific kind of insurance activity appears to be an essential part of 
regular operations of insurance business entity. The reinsurance operation can be defined as a 
contractual arrangement between a reinsurer and a professional insurer, who alone is fully 
responsible to the policy holder, under which in return for reward the reinsurer bears all or 
part of the risks assumed by the direct insurer and agrees to reimburse according to specified 
conditions all or part of the sums due or paid by the cedent to the insured in case of claims [4, 
p.45]. In a reinsurance contract, as the result of successfully performed reinsurance operation, 
one party (the reinsurer) for a certain premium agrees to indemnify another party (the 
reinsured) for specified parts of its underwritten insurance risk [1].  
So, in general, reinsurance agreement is an arrangement between an insurer and a reinsurer 
under which claims that occur in a fixed period of time (e.g. one year) are split between the 
ceding and reinsuring company in agreed manner. Thus, the insurer is effectively insuring the 
part of a risk with a reinsurer and provides a corresponding premium for reinsurer for this 
cover. The risk indemnified against, is the risk that the insurer will have to pay on the 
underlying insured risk as the insurable event occurs [6, p.11].  
More precisely, reinsurance treaties are mutual agreements between different insurance 
companies with the aim to reduce the risk of the occurring followed by the reduction of the 
premium of the portfolio [15, p.142]. Along with sharing proportionally in premium and 
losses, the reinsurer typically pays a ceding commission to the ceding company to reimburse 
for expenses associated with issuing the underlying policy, i.e. a contribution towards the 
acquisition costs incurred by the direct insurer while setting the original agreement with 
insured party [9]. 
Despite the fact, that reinsurance is a form of risk sharing between insurance companies, the 
question of whether or not reinsurance can be considered insurance has given rise to 
numerous theoretical developments. Most of actuarial literature appeals to the idea that by the 
nature of operations reinsurance is the insurance of insurance companies. However, in 
European reality this statement appears to be highly controversial, since no definition of 
insurance business is given by the legal laws of member states of the European Union or by 
European law. For the instance, under French law reinsurance treaties are no insurance 
	   7	  
contracts and reinsurers are not insurers, namely the Insurance Code specifies that reinsurance 
operations are excluded from the scope of insurance contract law. The same holds under most 
European laws. 
Therefore, it may be not completely coherent to consider reinsurance activity identical to 
insurance. Under the law reinsurers are not insurers of insurers. Indeed, in the number of 
European states reinsurers are subject to far lighter licensing procedures and prudential rules 
than primary insurers and in some countries they are not even regulated. They are not insurers 
of the insured, as the Insurance Code stipulates that the cedent despite setting the reinsurance 
agreement remains alone liable to the holder of insurance policy [4, p.46]. 
The reinsurance relationship is usually structured so that the risk is firstly offered for coverage 
to insurer by insured and after the part of this risk or its full amount is transferred to reinsurer 
according to the rules of corresponding reinsurance activity accepted by cedent. However, the 
reinsurance scheme may include more than two participants. A direct insurer can make a 
decision to cede certain risk under one contract or purchase several contracts covering 
different aspects or portions of the same policy to achieve the desired degree of coverage. A 
layering process involving two or more reinsurance agreements is commonly employed to 
obtain sufficient monetary limits of reinsurance protection and, when a claim occurs the 
reinsurers respond in a predetermined order to cover the loss. On its turn, the reinsurance 
company may itself, again for some suitable premium, pass on parts of the reinsured risks to 
another reinsurer (both domestic and international), which is called retrocession [1]. Hence, 
the scale of reinsurance agreements related to certain risk or a group of risks may enlarge 
significantly.  
1.2. Main Purpose and Objectives of Reinsurance Activity 
Being an essential element of insurance operations, reinsurance reasonably comes into action, 
when an individual risk is too big for the given insurance company or the loss potential of the 
entire portfolio is too heavy. Therefore, reinsurance is an utter necessity for portfolios, which 
are subject to catastrophic risks such as earthquakes, hurricanes, floods, failures of nuclear 
power stations, tanker accidents, wars, riots [15, p.142].  
In this case the risk of potential losses is adequately separated between parties of reinsurance 
agreement, i.e. the fundamental function of reinsurance – risk spreading – is realized. Risk 
spreading possibility allows the insurance company to maintain stability and certainty that its 
activity in some part is secured from the risk of unpredictable losses. Besides risk spreading 
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function reinsurance serves a number of other substantial functions for the direct insurance 
company, namely: increasing the capacity to write insurance (under prevailing insurance-
regulatory law), stabilizing financial results through providing the protection against financial 
losses, protecting against catastrophic losses and financing growth [20, p.5]. 
1.3. The Legal Classification of Reinsurance Operations 
In order to figure out all the possible kinds of the reinsurance contracts settled between ceding 
companies and reinsurers, the available reinsurance possibilities by the form of mutual 
obligations, i.e. by the rights and duties of the contracting parties, can be distinguished. In this 
aspect all arrangements can be classified as facultative individual reinsurance, facultative-
obligatory agreements and compulsory treaty reinsurance contracts. 
1) Facultative (individual) reinsurance is historically the first form of cover. The object 
of the treaty is a given risk already analyzed by the insurer who forwards his analysis to 
potential reinsurers. The cedent offers a cover for this risk, hence this kind of agreement 
implies that direct insurer has a right to offer a single risk to one of several reinsurers and the 
latter is free to decide whether to accept the suggested risk fully, partially or to decline it [20, 
p.70]. 
2) Facultative-obligatory reinsurance provides different rights and obligations of parties 
of reinsurance agreement. The decision concerning transferring of the particular share of the 
risk depends on the direct insurer, so, in this sense, for him the treaty remains optional. The 
reinsurer, on the contrary, is obliged to accept the cessions decided by its cedent, hence for the 
reinsurer the agreement is mandatory to accept. 
3) Obligatory (treaty) reinsurance restores symmetry of rights and duties between the 
contracting parties. During such operations the ceding company agrees to cede according to 
given procedures all or part of the risks during a given period, very often equal to an 
accounting period. The reinsurer, on its turn, is obliged to accept all the cessions that are 
proposed to him under these conditions. Unlike facultative reinsurance, this kind of contract 
refers to the transferring of not a single risk, but the entire portfolio under the agreed upon 
conditions. This implies much less management efforts related to setting and tracing 
reinsurance arrangements, hence obligatory reinsurance agreement is the most widely used in 
practice. However, insurers sometimes purchase both facultative and treaty reinsurance to 
cover the same risk. Unless there are contract terms to the contrary, the facultative reinsurance 
will perform first and completely before any of the treaty reinsurance performs  [4, p.48]. 
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1.4. The Technical Classification of Reinsurance Agreements 
The reinsurance activity is realized through a number of different types of agreements 
between ceding and accepting part. These contracts can be settled using different principles of 
dividing responsibility between direct insuring and reinsuring companies, namely 
proportional and non-proportional approach to estimation of the methodology of risk transfer. 
In all forms of reinsurance agreements both, proportional and non-proportional types of 
contract, are distinguished.   
1) The proportional reinsurance, also known as “Pro Rata reinsurance”, implies that 
insurer pays a fixed proportion of each claim, that occur during the period of the reinsurance 
contract, and the remaining part of claim is reimbursed by the reinsurer. The distinctive 
characteristic of this type of insurance agreement is that the proportion between reinsurance 
premium and gross premium is equal to proportion between reinsurance and gross claim for 
each individual risk insured:  𝐶𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑑  𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚𝑠𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠  𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚𝑠 = 𝐶𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑑  𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑖𝑚𝑠𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠  𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑖𝑚𝑠   . 
In order to express the formulas of the most common types of reinsurance agreements, 
consider the following notations: 
S − sum insured of the arbitrary risk in the portfolio; 
X − amount of an individual claim; 
Y − amount of claim paid by the direct insurer; 
Z − amount of claim paid by the reinsurer. 
So, in all cases the total claim is split between ceding company and reinsurer, i.e. 𝑋 = 𝑌 + 𝑍. 
The proportional reinsurance is performed in the form of quota share and surplus reinsurance 
arrangements.  
a) Under a quota share agreement being the most straightforward kind of reinsurance 
contract the ceding company retains a fixed percentage of each risk (say a proportion 𝛽, 0   <   𝛽   <   1) of the covered portfolio and transfers to the reinsurer the remaining share 
(proportion 1  −   𝛽), hence the reinsurer pays the same proportion of each claim and receives 
equal proportion of gross premium (with commissions deducted).  
So, 𝑌 and 𝑍 as the amounts of a claim compensated by the direct insurer and reinsurer are 
defined as follows: 
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𝑌   =   𝛽𝑋,   𝑍   =    1  –   𝛽 𝑋.     (1.1) 
According to the definition of 𝑌  and 𝑍, the main parameters of corresponding quantities are:  
− expected value: 𝐸 𝑌 =   𝛽𝐸 𝑋 ,   𝐸 𝑍 =    1  –   𝛽 𝐸 𝑋 ;           (1.2) 
− variance: 𝑉𝑎𝑟 𝑌 =   𝛽!𝑉𝑎𝑟 𝑋 ,   𝑉𝑎𝑟 𝑍 =    1− 𝛽 !𝑉𝑎𝑟 𝑋 ;        (1.3) 
− standard deviation of claims:  𝑆𝐷 𝑌 =   𝛽𝑆𝐷 𝑋 ,   𝑆𝐷 𝑍 =    1  –   𝛽 𝑆𝐷 𝑋 .   (1.4) 
Since the whole loss volume is split up between the ceding and reinsuring companies in 
certain proportion, the reinsurer does not carry the full responsibility for the “risky tail” of the 
claim distribution, thus this type of reinsurance is considered as the more attractive for the 
latter [11, p.222]. 
b) Surplus agreement implies that the ceding company retains certain maximum sum of 
each risk. In non-life insurance this limit is called “deductible” or, more generally, “retention 
level”, and, specifically in the analyzed type of reinsurance arrangement, − “one line” 
(denoted by 𝑚). This maximum retention may vary greatly from risk class to another.  
If the incurred loss exceeds the insurer’s retention level, the amount above the limit is ceded 
to reinsurer, but only up to a certain multiple of retention (e.g. 10  lines). Once these cession 
rates are determined, the treaty operates as a quota share for each policy. Risks, whose insured 
value exceeds the underwriting limit, do not fall within the scope of the treaty. This leads to 
sole responsibility of the ceding company for the “risky tail” of claim amount distribution.  
The cedent’s and reinsurer’s parts of reimbursement can be defined as 
𝑌 =     𝑋                                    𝑖𝑓  𝑆 ≤ 𝑚  𝑚𝑆 𝑋                          𝑖𝑓  𝑆 > 𝑚, 𝑍 =     0                                          𝑖𝑓  𝑆 ≤ 𝑚1−𝑚𝑆 𝑋            𝑖𝑓  𝑆 > 𝑚. 
The advantage of the surplus agreement over the quota share is that it allows to model the 
retained risk profile of insurer with greater precision: the higher is the cedent’s risks, the 
bigger share of it will be reinsured, i.e. the percentage of premium and liability ceded for each 
risk can vary. However, this type of treaty is relatively seldom used except for portfolios of 
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very reduced sizes, since it entails a more time-consuming administrative management than in 
the quota share case, since retention rates, consequently premiums and ceded claims, are 
determined on a policy-by-policy basis, which is unreasonably complex unless the number of 
risks is very small. Non-proportional reinsurance allows insurer to fix the same set of cessions 
more efficiently and with much less administrative efforts [4, p.54]. 
Proportional reinsurance, despite the fact that both insurer and reinsurer deal with all risks has 
significant advantages, namely simplicity of administrating and strong protection against 
severity of losses.  
2) Non-proportional reinsurance includes all the treaties, which by their construction do 
not satisfy the property of similarity between the rates of ceded premiums and ceded claims. 
This kind of reinsurance agreement is realized through several types of contracts, specifically 
excess of loss, stop loss and largest claims reinsurance.  
a) Excess of loss treaty refers to a term describing a reinsurance transaction, that being 
subject to a specified limit, indemnifies a ceding company against the amount of loss in 
excess of a specified retention. Hence on each claim exceeding the priority (the retention level 
of the direct insurer, known as a threshold or first risk denoted by 𝑀,𝑀   >   0), reinsurer will 
compensate the exceeding amount subject to a maximum (cover amount fixed by the parties 
of reinsurance contract, called a second risk). Therefore, under this type of agreement a claim 
is shared between the direct insurer and reinsurer only if the claim exceeds a fixed amount of 
retention, otherwise the insurer reimburse the full amount of claim [6, p.13]. 
So, the amounts paid by direct insurer and reinsurer can be expressed in the following way: 
                                              𝑌 = 𝑋                  𝑖𝑓  𝑋 ≤ 𝑀𝑀                𝑖𝑓  𝑋 > 𝑀,   𝑍 = 0                          𝑖𝑓𝑋 ≤ 𝑀𝑋 −𝑀        𝑖𝑓  𝑋 > 𝑀.         (1.5) 
The given expressions can be rewritten as                                           𝑌 = min  (𝑋,𝑀),     𝑍 = max 0,𝑋 −𝑀 .       (1.6) 
Under the conditions of excess of loss reinsurance the direct insurer has limited liability on 
each claim (maximum threshold 𝑀), therefore no exposure to the “risky tail” of the claim 
amount distribution. It apparently causes a higher profitability of the given type of risk 
transfer from the ceding company’s point of view. 
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The expected value of the direct insurer’s payoff under the excess of loss reinsurance treaty 
can be derived as follows: 
𝐸 𝑌 = 𝑥𝑓!!! 𝑥 𝑑𝑥 + 𝑀𝑓!!! 𝑥 𝑑𝑥 = 𝑥𝑓!!! 𝑥 𝑑𝑥 − 𝑥𝑓!!! 𝑥 𝑑𝑥 + 𝑀𝑓!!! 𝑥 𝑑𝑥= 𝐸 𝑋 − 𝑥 −𝑀 𝑓!!! 𝑥 𝑑𝑥,                                                                                                                                                      (1.7) 
where 𝑓!is the probability density function of the individual claim amount 𝑋 and 𝐸 𝑍 =𝑥 −𝑀 𝑓!!! 𝑥 𝑑𝑥   is the expected amount of reinsurer’s payout of the claim representing 
an expected reduction in the payout of claims of the direct insurer [20, p.71].  
Considerable advantage of the excess of loss reinsurance is that among all individual 
reinsurances with the same expected reinsurance loss and the same reinsurance premium 
excess of loss reinsurance is optimal, in the sense that it is not possible to find any other type 
of reinsurance with a retained risk less risky in the sense of the stop loss order. This explains 
why excess of loss reinsurance is so common on the reinsurance market [5]. 
b) The second type of non-proportional reinsurance agreement, stop loss treaty, aims to 
fulfill the main purpose of reinsurance – stabilization of the net result rate, i.e. limitation of 
the ceding’s company yearly loss. With a stop loss the reinsurer pays all the claims exceeding 
a certain percentage of underlying premium volume (called as retention or stop loss point) up 
to a specified limit.  
The direct insurer’s and reinsurer’s parts of reimbursement are given as:  
𝑌 = 𝑋                            𝑖𝑓  𝑋 ≤ 𝜌𝑃𝜌𝑃                      𝑖𝑓  𝑋 > 𝜌𝑃, 𝑍 = 0                                𝑖𝑓  𝑋 ≤ 𝜌𝑃𝑋 − 𝜌𝑃          𝑖𝑓  𝑋 > 𝜌𝑃. 
Here 𝜌𝑃 represents the stop loss point depending on the gross premium volume 𝑃 and agreed 
upon limiting percentage 𝜌 of the premium [20, p.74]. 
The expected claim payout of the direct insurer and reinsurer as a special case of excess of 
loss reinsurance with retention level denoted as 𝜗 = 𝜌𝑃  (𝜗 > 0), can be expressed in the 
following way:  
𝐸 𝑌 = 𝐸 𝑋 − 𝑥 − 𝜗 𝑓!!! 𝑥 𝑑𝑥,  
 𝐸 𝑍 = 𝑥 − 𝜗 𝑓!!! 𝑥 𝑑𝑥. 
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Hence by the way of performing stop loss reinsurance is similar to excess of loss case, 
however implying that the retention level depends directly on the gross premium level and the 
level of profitability the cedent aims to maintain in case of huge actual claim burden. 
c) Largest claims reinsurance is designed for coverage against excessive claims and 
stipulates that the reinsurer pays a certain number of largest claims of one year. As a type of 
extreme value reinsurance, largest claims reinsurance is less frequent kind of reinsurance 
treaty. This kind of agreement is mostly settled in combinations with excess of loss or stop 
loss reinsurance [20, p.72]. 
Therefore, the proportional reinsurance has considerable advantages, namely: good protection 
against frequency or severity potential depending upon the retention level, a greater net 
premium retention allowed for direct insurer, higher reasonableness in terms of reinsurance 
premium and cost of administration [17, p.7].  
1.5. The Question of Optimality of Reinsurance Contract 
So, the insurance practice has developed a range of types of agreements available for setting 
between the direct insurer and reinsuring party. However, each reinsurance form has its 
particular advantages and disadvantages in terms of the type of protection it provides 
(frequency risk, large claim risk), premium calculation, practical handling, administration and 
processing of loss estimation (including issues like moral hazard and adverse selection) [1]. 
Moreover, the question of optimal reinsurance agreement contains not only the complexity of 
the choice between various kinds of reinsurance contracts, but, what is of the prior 
importance, the problem of estimation of parameters of such an agreement, namely the scale 
of insurer’s (or reinsurer’s) responsibility for a given risk or set of risks.  
Since retention level appears to be a principal parameter in the relation between direct insurer 
and reinsurer, any type of reinsurance contract is in some way determined by cession rate. The 
estimation of this rate consequently needs significant preciseness and particular analysis. 
Hence in the past few years the problem of optimal reinsurance contract gained much interest 
in actuarial literature inducing the development of a number of numerical approaches aiming 
to determine the most reasonable parameters of reinsurance arrangements. 
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2. OPTIMIZING REINSURANCE CONTRACTS  
When making a decision concerning settling the reinsurance agreement, direct insurance 
company bears a responsibility of choosing the type of reinsurance contract and fixing its 
main parameter – the level of retained risk. Hence, primary concerns in this aspect are related 
to the choice of an appropriate reinsurance type and the extent of coverage to be purchased. In 
particular, the direct insurer's management require an evaluation process that would be 
capable of aiding their assertions about what kind of contract to settle and under which 
conditions.  
However, the general analysis of possible reinsurance agreement, as an important part of the 
decision making process, involves not only the consideration of the elements of the 
reinsurance contract, but also the relationship of the reinsurance decision to the other risk-
related decisions of the ceding company, which include the choices of reserving policies, risk 
pooling, investment policies. And since all of these decisions affect the total risk picture of the 
firm, they should not be made independently [18].  
The problem of fixing the reasonable retention level is a very complex one− on the one hand 
because of number of different criteria like solvency requirement, company’s capacity, 
financing, services provided, the desirable level of net result, as a measure and objective of 
company’s activity, and, on the other hand, because in practice insurers are not concentrated 
upon setting up one single retention, but rather how to design in the somehow optimal way an 
entire insurance or reinsurance program [20, p.76].  
Nevertheless, the actuarial science developed several optimization approaches based on 
different ideas, but following the same aim – to determine the expression of insurer’s 
retention such that certain positive outcome of insurer’s activity will be achieved. When 
performing the optimization procedure, an insurer may have a concrete objective, such as to 
maximize expected total wealth by the end of certain period (subject to a certain security level 
condition), to minimize the volatility of expected revenue after reinsurance, to improve a 
control over the variability of total claim amount or to minimize the probability of company’s 
insolvency. Hence, all available methodologies refer to different indexes, however are guided 
by the same prime purpose − estimation of the most reasonable retained share of risk under 
different kinds of arrangements. 
Namely, the first examined optimization procedure − so called utility approach – appeals to 
maximization of the insurer’s wealth resulting from arranging the reinsurance agreement, 
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using cedent’s utility function. The other optimization approach investigates the best retention 
strategy from the insurer’s point of view with respect to minimization of the variability of its 
net profit after covering all reinsurance related costs. Both procedures are performed from the 
cedent’s perspective, hence the derived formulas of retention levels can be applied by the 
direct insurer when making the decisions concerning reinsurance agreements.  
However, in practice the concrete form and amount of reinsurance choice for a certain 
portfolio are often influenced by experience, availability of reinsurance offers and current 
market prices as well [1]. Therefore, the reinsurance solutions are much more complex, 
including many factors beyond the reinsurance activity and are not limited only by the 
problem of the optimal cession rate. 
2.1. Utility Maximization Approach 
Utility approach appears to be one of the most developing technics of reinsurance 
optimization, rapidly gaining its popularity over last several decades. In particular, Friefelder 
[8] suggests that "the best method of determining property-liability insurance rates is through 
the use of utility theory". Friefelder's arguments can be applied equally strongly to the 
reinsurance decision, whereby the expected utility decision criterion can be usefully applied to 
the problem of the evaluation of reinsurance alternatives and estimation of the optimal share 
of the retained risk.  
In order to investigate the possibilities of optimization of reinsurance contracts through the 
maximization of utility function consider the direct insurer performing insurance activity, 
which may result in gains or losses, with the initial capital 𝑊. Assume that the direct insurer 
adopts the utility function 𝑢(𝑥). In particular, we assume that insurer has an exponential 
utility function 
𝑢 𝑥 = !! 1− 𝑒!!" ,                                                  (2.1) 
where 𝛼  (𝛼   >   0) is an absolute risk aversion of the direct insurer. Since constants in the 
function are for scaling purpose, we consider the exponential utility function in the form 𝑢 𝑥 = −𝑒!!", for some 𝛼   >   0. 
If a certain action 𝐴 leads to financial gain 𝑄(𝐴), the direct insurer objectively chooses the 
action  𝐴, which maximizes 𝐸 𝑢 𝑊 + 𝑄 𝐴 = 𝐸 −𝑒!! !!! ! . 
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It can be assumed that the ceding part is exposed to the risks with aggregate claims variable S, 
having the compound Poisson distribution with parameter λ (i.e. 𝑆  ~  𝐶𝑃  (  𝜆,𝐹!), where 𝐹!  is 
a cumulative distribution function of 𝑋).  
The given methodology will be applied in case of two most common types of reinsurance 
agreements: proportional (quota share) and non-proportional (excess of loss). 
2.1.1. The Quota Share Reinsurance  
Consider a direct insurer setting a quota share reinsurance agreement with retention 
proportion 𝛽, incurring aggregate claim amount 𝑆! = 𝛽𝑆 (𝑆!   ~  𝐶𝑃  (𝜆,𝐹!), where 𝑌 = 𝛽𝑋). 
The reinsurer, on its turn, takes a responsibility for the aggregate claims 𝑆! = 1− 𝛽 𝑆 
(𝑆!   ~  𝐶𝑃  (𝜆,𝐹!), where 𝑍 = (1− 𝛽)𝑋 ). Hence the moment generating function of 𝑆!  is 𝑀!! 𝑡 = 𝑒!(!! ! !!) = 𝑒!(!! (!!!)! !!). 
Assume that the reinsurer charges a premium 𝑃!  estimated with the exponential principle with 
the loading factor 𝜂. The expression of the premium considering that the reinsurer adopts the 
utility function 𝑢 𝑥 = −𝑒!!" is the following: 
𝑃! = 1𝜂 ln𝐸 𝑒!!! = 1𝜂 ln𝑀!! 𝜂 = 1𝜂 𝜆 𝑀! 1− 𝛽 𝜂 − 1  =    𝜆𝜂 𝑒 1−𝛽 𝜂𝑥∞0 𝑓𝑋 𝑥 𝑑𝑥 − 1 ,                                   (2.2) 
where 𝑓! 𝑥  is the probability density function of 𝑋 and 𝜂  is the reinsurer’s premium loading 
factor.  
So, by the end of insurance period the direct insurer’s wealth will be 𝑊 + 𝑃 − 𝑃! − 𝛽𝑆, 
where 𝑃 is the company’s gross premium. Thus, the goal of the optimization is maximizing 
the following equality over all 𝛽  (0 ≤ 𝛽 ≤ 1) 𝐸 𝑢 𝑊 + 𝑃 − 𝑃! − 𝛽𝑆 = 𝐸 −𝑒!! !!!!!!!!" = −𝑒!!(!!!)𝑒!!!𝐸 𝑒!"# , 
which is equivalent to the minimization of the direct insurer’s expected payoff 𝑒!!!𝐸 𝑒!"# = 𝑒!!!𝑀! 𝛼𝛽 = 𝑒!!!𝑀! 𝑙𝑛𝑀! 𝛼𝛽   
and, considering that number of claims 𝑁 has Poisson distribution, the previous expression 
can be rewritten as 𝑒!!!𝑀! 𝑙𝑛𝑀! 𝛼𝛽 = 𝑒!!!𝑒! !! !" !! . 
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Thus, after taking logarithms, the minimizing problem can be stated as finding 𝛽  that 
minimizes ℎ 𝛽 = 𝛼𝑃! + 𝜆 𝑒!"#!! 𝑓! 𝑥 𝑑𝑥 .                                         (2.3) 
This function can be differentiated with respect to 𝛽 in order to find the optimal proportion of 
cedent’s retention. 
Given the formula for the reinsurer’s premium 𝑃!(2.2), the derivative of the function (2.3) 
with respect to 𝛽  is the following 𝜕ℎ(𝛽)𝜕𝛽 = 𝛼 𝜆𝜂 −𝜂 𝑥𝑒 !!! !"!! 𝑓! 𝑥 𝑑𝑥 + 𝜆 𝛼 𝑥𝑒!"#!! 𝑓! 𝑥 𝑑𝑥= −𝛼𝜆 𝑥𝑒 !!! !"!! 𝑓! 𝑥 𝑑𝑥 + 𝛼𝜆 𝑥𝑒!"#!! 𝑓! 𝑥 𝑑𝑥= −𝛼𝜆 [𝑒 !!! !"!! − 𝑒!"#]𝑥𝑓! 𝑥 𝑑𝑥. 
Therefore, the only case when ℎ! 𝛽 = 0 is if 1− 𝛽 𝜂 = 𝛼𝛽. It follows, that  𝛽 = !!!!  .          (2.4) 
The distinctive feature of the obtained formula is that the retention level in case of quota-share 
reinsurance of the direct insurer is independent of the individual claim amount distribution. 
The proportion of the risk kept by the cedent is influenced only by the risk aversion of the 
insurer (𝛼) and premium loading parameter of the reinsurer (𝜂). Therefore, the more risk 
averse the direct insurer is, the higher is the risk aversion parameter coming from the utility 
function of the cedent and, consequently smaller share of the risk will be retained by the 
insurer. Thus, the result implies, that as the insurer’s risk aversion increases, the insurer’s 
share of each incurred claim decreases [6, p.191-192]. 
To conclude with application of utility function to the optimization of direct insurer’s 
retention level, it should be mentioned that the analyzed approach has a set of limitations. As 
the analysis is based on the exponential utility function, the premium received by direct 
insurer does not effect the decision concerning risk retention level. However, if to assume that 
the reinsurance premium is paid from the original premium collected by cedent, it may seem 
unreasonable to ignore the impact of insurer’s premium size.  
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2.1.2. The Excess of Loss Reinsurance  
The second analyzed type of the reinsurance arrangements is non-proportional excess of loss 
contract. Hence, consider the direct insurer, adopting excess of loss reinsurance agreement 
with retention level 𝑀, collecting premium 𝑃 for the given risk (group of risks). The reinsurer, 
accepting the risk, charges the premium 𝑃!, determined with the expected value principle, 
assuming the loading factor 𝜉.  
Hence, the reinsurer’s premium can be expressed as follows 𝑃! = 1+ 𝜉 𝜆𝐸 𝑍 = 1+ 𝜉 𝜆 𝑥𝑓! 𝑥 𝑑𝑥 −!! 𝑥𝑓! 𝑥 𝑑𝑥 −!! 𝑀 1− 𝐹! 𝑀  = 1+ 𝜉 𝜆 𝑥 −𝑀 𝑓!!! 𝑥 𝑑𝑥.                                              (2.5) 
The direct insurer’s aggregate claim amount 𝑆!  has a Compound Poisson distribution 
(𝑆!   ~  𝐶𝑃  (𝜆,𝐹!)), where 𝑌 is the claim amount of the ceding company net reinsured claims. 
Hence, the moment generating function of 𝑆! is  𝑀!! 𝑡 = 𝐸 𝑒!!! = 𝐸[𝑒!(!! ! !!)]. 
Since the aggregate claim amount 𝑆!   depends on the threshold 𝑀, the moment generating 
function 𝑀!! 𝑡  depends on 𝑀 as well. 
As the ceding company aims to maximize its wealth, i.e. support and increase profitability, 
the optimization procedure implies the maximization of the current company’s wealth at a 
given time moment. Therefore, by the end of the insurance period the ceding company’s 
wealth is 𝑊 + 𝑃 − 𝑃! − 𝑆!, so 𝑀 should be chosen such that  𝐸 𝑢 𝑊 + 𝑃 − 𝑃! − 𝑆! = 𝐸 −𝑒!! !!!!!!!!! = −𝑒!!(!!!)𝑒!!!𝐸[𝑒!!!] 
is maximized. This is equivalent to minimizing of the cedent’s expected payout over all 
possible thresholds 𝑀, expressed by the following equality: 𝑒!!!𝐸 𝑒!!! = 𝑒!!!𝑒!(!! ! !!). 
Thus, after taking logarithms, we can state our minimization problem as finding threshold 𝑀, 
which minimizes ℎ 𝑀 = 𝛼𝑃! + 𝜆 𝑀! 𝛼 − 1 .                                              (2.6) 
Now taking into account the expression of 𝑃!    2.5 , and also considering that 𝑀! 𝛼 = 𝑒!"!! 𝑓! 𝑥 𝑑𝑥 + 𝑒!"(1− 𝐹! 𝑀 ) , 
the derivative of function (2.6) can be written as: 
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𝜕ℎ(𝑀)𝜕𝑀 = 𝛼𝜆 1+ 𝜉 −𝑀𝑓! 𝑀 − 1− 𝐹! 𝑀 +𝑀𝑓! 𝑀+ 𝜆 𝑒!"𝑓! 𝑀 + 𝛼𝑒!" 1− 𝐹! 𝑀 − 𝑒!"𝑓! 𝑀=   −𝛼𝜆 1+ 𝜉 1− 𝐹! 𝑀 + 𝜆𝛼𝑒!" 1− 𝐹! 𝑀= 𝛼𝜆 1− 𝐹! 𝑀 𝑒!" − 1+ 𝜉 . 
Consequently, ℎ′ 𝑀 = 0 when 𝑀 satisfies one of the following cases: 
1) 𝐹! 𝑀 = 1 , meaning that the retention proportion is equal to 1, i.e. “no reinsurance” 
case. 
2) 1+ 𝜉 = 𝑒!", which, after taking logarithm, implies the following retention level 𝑀 = !! ln(1+ 𝜉),      (2.7) 
Thereby, optimal retention level depends on the parameter of the utility function, namely 
insurer’s risk aversion, and parameter of the reinsurer’s premium calculation principle, but 
does not depend on the individual claim amount distribution, similarly to the previous case. 
Retention level 𝑀 appears as an increasing function of 𝜉 implying that the direct insurer will 
keep a bigger share of the risk as the price of the risk transfer increases. The risk aversion 
parameter 𝛼, on the contrary, has an inverse relation with retention level: as the insurer’s risk 
aversion increases, the portion of risk retained decreases, hence the cedent’s share of each 
claim falls [6, p.193]. 
2.2. Direct Insurer’s Net Profit Variance Minimization Approach  
In order to express the most reasonable retention rate another possible methodology can be 
considered. This approach is based on the idea of minimizing the variability of the cedent’s 
net profit, after covering all reinsurance expenses. The examined model was proposed by B. 
de Finetti and applied in cases of excess of loss and quota-share reinsurance arrangements 
(1940). In given optimization problem the direct insurer, holding the portfolio, consisting on 𝑛 independent risks, is taken into consideration. For each of risks (group of risks) the direct 
insurer arranges a reinsurance contract (excess of loss or quota share agreement). However, in 
further analysis a certain group of risks will be assumed as a separate insurance portfolio 
being an object of reinsurance optimization procedure. 
The cost of reinsurance is determined with the expected value principle (i.e. the security 
loading, fixed by the reinsurer, is added to its expected payout of each separate risk). The 
variance, as the target of minimization, is considered to be a subject to the fixed suitable 
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constraint, namely the expected value of cedent’s net profit. Hence, given methodology 
implies the identifying of optimal retained proportions of risks, such that secure the direct 
insurer against the variability of achieved revenue and increase its financial stability.  
2.2.1. The Quota Share Reinsurance 
Firstly, assume the cedent with the insurance portfolio, settling the quota share reinsurance 
agreement. For the given portfolio of risks aggregate claim amount is 𝑆 with compound 
Poisson distribution (𝑆~  𝐶𝑃(𝜆  ,𝐹!), where 𝑋 is the claim amount variable, with a distribution 
function 𝐹!  and probability density function 𝑓!. 
Since the aim of optimization is to minimize variance of cedent’s expected net profit in 
respect to its fixed expected value (i.e. the desirable outcome defined by insurer), all the 
components of reinsurance process, influencing the insurer’s financial outcome, should be 
considered.  
For each insured risk (group of risks) the following parameters should be assumed: 
𝑀 − the cedent’s retention level; 𝑃 − the cedent’s premium charged for the risk; 𝑌 − the direct insurer’s payout of incurred claim; 𝑍 − the reinsurer’s payoff of incurred claim; 𝑆!− the insurer’s total payout of claims for risk; 𝑆!− the reinsurer’s aggregate payout of claims for underlying risk; 𝜉− the reinsurer’s security loading, referred to in the premium calculations. 
Hence, to set up the optimization problem, assume the following quantities: 
− the reinsurer’s premium charged 1+ 𝜉 𝐸 𝑆! = 1+ 𝜉 1− 𝛽 𝐸 𝑆 ;        (2.8) 
− the cedent’s net profit                         𝑁𝑃 𝛽 = 𝑃 − 1+ 𝜉 𝐸 𝑆! − 𝑆! = 𝑃 − 1+ 𝜉 1− 𝛽 𝐸 𝑆 − 𝑆!;                                 (2.9) 
− the expectation of insurer’s net profit, as a suitable constraint for variance minimization,          𝐸 𝑁𝑃 𝛽 = 𝑃 − 1+ 𝜉 1− 𝛽 𝐸 𝑆 − 𝛽𝐸 𝑆 = 𝑃 − 1− 𝛽 − 𝜉𝛽 + 𝜉 𝐸 𝑆 − 𝛽𝐸 𝑆  = 𝑃 − (1− 𝜉𝛽 + 𝜉)𝐸 𝑆 ;                                                   (2.10) 
− variance of the net profit, following from (1.3) is, respectively, 
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𝑉𝑎𝑟 𝑁𝑃 𝛽 = 𝑉𝑎𝑟 𝑆! = 𝛽!𝑉𝑎𝑟 𝑆 .       (2.11) 
Applying the method of Lagrange multipliers to perform given optimization, define the 
function ℎ(𝛽)  as ℎ 𝛽 =   𝑉𝑎𝑟 𝑁𝑃 𝛽 − 𝛾 𝐸 𝑁𝑃 𝛽 − 𝑐 ,        (2.12) 
where 𝑐  denotes the constant value of expected net profit as a suitable constraint for the given 
optimization problem. 
The derivatives of 𝐸[𝑁𝑃(𝛽)]   and 𝑉𝑎𝑟[𝑁𝑃(𝛽)]  from (2.12) with respect to 𝛽  are !!" 𝐸 𝑁𝑃 𝛽 = 𝜉𝐸 𝑆   and  !!" 𝑉𝑎𝑟 𝑁𝑃 𝛽 = 2𝛽𝑉𝑎𝑟 𝑆  accordingly. Thereby, the derivative 
of the function ℎ(𝛽)  with respect to 𝛽 is given as 𝜕ℎ𝜕𝛽 = 2𝛽𝑉𝑎𝑟 𝑆 − 𝛾𝜉𝐸 𝑆 , 
and, consequently, the extremal value of ℎ is reached if 
         2𝛽𝑉𝑎𝑟 𝑆 = 𝛾𝜉𝐸 𝑆   ⇔   𝛽 = 𝛾𝜉𝐸 𝑆2𝑉𝑎𝑟 𝑆 .                                                                                          (2.13) 
The obtained formula of optimal retention display that the cedent’s relative retention does not 
depend on total premium collected for the given risk i, but is in direct relation with the 
reinsurer’s security loading (the higher 𝜉, the bigger premium the reinsurer will charge and 
the smaller share of risk will be passed to the reinsurer) [9].  
The obtained optimization result appears to be indeed straightforward. The reverse relation 
between retained risk proportion and variance of direct insurer’s total claims identifies the 
cedent’s tending to increase the cession rate if its total claim amount has a higher variability, 
i.e. the riskiness of insurance operations is higher due to the increased probability of huge or 
frequent claim arrival.  
2.2.2. The Excess of Loss Reinsurance 
The same optimization idea can be implemented in case, when the direct insurer arranges a 
non-proportional (excess of loss) reinsurance treaty. In this aspect, consider the direct insurer 
holding the same portfolio of risks with corresponding parameters as in the previous section, 
settle the excess of loss reinsurance agreement with a threshold 𝑀. 
To achieve the goal of optimization, i.e. fix the reasonable retained risk share, through the 
minimization of uncertainty of the expected net profit of direct insurer, the set of quantities 
should be considered. 
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Namely, the reinsurer’s premium, charged for the portfolio of risks, can be given as    1+ 𝜉 𝐸 𝑆! = 1+ 𝜉 𝜆𝐸 𝑍 = 1+ 𝜉 𝜆 (𝑥 −𝑀!! )𝑓! 𝑥 𝑑𝑥.              (2.14) 
The direct insurer’s payout on the given portfolio can be expressed as follows 
                            𝐸 𝑆! = 𝜆𝐸 𝑌 = 𝜆 𝑥𝑓!!! 𝑥 𝑑𝑥 +𝑀 1− 𝐹! 𝑀 ,                        (2.15) 
where 𝑌  is the direct insurer’s payout on individual incurred claim. 
The expected net profit of the direct insurer, depending on the cedent’s premium for the risk, 
reinsurance premium to be paid and total payout of claims, caused by the given risk, can be 
expressed (similarly to 2.9) as                                                                 𝑁𝑃 𝑀 = 𝑃 − 1+ 𝜉 𝐸 𝑆! − 𝑆! .                                       (2.16) 
The expected value of net profit, as one of major quantities required for estimation of optimal 
retention, considering the fact that 𝐸 𝑆! = 𝐸 𝑆!! + 𝐸 𝑆!! , can be determined as 𝐸 𝑁𝑃 𝑀 = 𝑃 − 1+ 𝜉 𝐸 𝑆! − 𝐸[𝑆!] = 𝑃 − 1+ 𝜉 (𝐸 𝑆 − 𝐸 𝑆! )− 𝐸[𝑆!] =   𝑃 − 1+ 𝜉 𝐸 𝑆 + 𝜉𝐸[𝑆!],                                                 (2.17) 
hence, the only source of randomness is the aggregate claim amount of given portfolio. 
Therefore, the uncertainty of the net profit is defined as 𝑉𝑎𝑟 𝑁𝑃 𝑀 = 𝑉𝑎𝑟[𝑆!] = 𝜆𝐸[𝑌]! = 𝜆 𝑥!𝑓! 𝑥 𝑑𝑥!! +𝑀! 1− 𝐹! 𝑀 .     (2.18) 
The given optimization problem can be solved applying the method of Lagrange multipliers 
with a variable 𝛾. Consider the following function, expressed using the method: ℎ 𝑀 =   𝑉𝑎𝑟 𝑁𝑃 𝑀 − 𝛾 𝐸 𝑁𝑃 𝑀 − 𝑐 .          (2.19) 
We set !!!" = 0 and, by using the rule that ( ℎ 𝑥 𝑑𝑥)!! = ℎ(𝑏)!!     and product rule, estimate 
derivatives of summands of (2.19) with respect to 𝑀. 
𝜕𝜕𝑀 𝑉𝑎𝑟 𝑁𝑃 𝑀 = 𝜕𝜕𝑀 𝜆 𝑥!𝑓! 𝑥!! 𝑑𝑥 +𝑀! 1− 𝐹! 𝑀= 𝜆 𝑀!𝑓! 𝑀 + 2𝑀 1− 𝐹! 𝑀 −𝑀!𝑓! 𝑀 = 2𝜆𝑀 1− 𝐹! 𝑀 . 
Since the total aggregate claim amount (𝐸 𝑆 ) does not depend on 𝑀, the derivative of 
expected net profit 𝐸 𝑁𝑃 𝑀   as it follows from formula (2.17) with respect to threshold 𝑀 
can be expressed as follows: 
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𝜕𝜕𝑀 𝐸 𝑁𝑃 𝑀 = 𝜕𝜕𝑀 (𝜉𝐸[𝑆!]) = 𝜕𝜕𝑀 𝜉[𝜆 𝑥𝑓!!! 𝑥 𝑑𝑥 +𝑀 1− 𝐹! 𝑀 ]= 𝜉𝜆(𝑀𝑓! 𝑀 + 1− 𝐹! 𝑀 −𝑀𝑓! 𝑀 ) = 𝜉𝜆 1− 𝐹! 𝑀 . 
Now substituting the derivatives of 𝐸[𝑁𝑃 𝑀 ] and 𝑉𝑎𝑟[𝑁𝑃 𝑀 ] into (2.19), we obtain 𝜕ℎ𝜕𝑀 = 2𝜆𝑀 1− 𝐹! 𝑀 − 𝛾𝜉𝜆 1− 𝐹 𝑀 , 
and, consequently, the optimal retention level is reached if  2𝜆𝑀 1− 𝐹! 𝑀 =   𝜉𝛾𝜆 1− 𝐹! 𝑀 . 
Since 1− 𝐹 𝑀 ≠ 0,  the optimal retention level can be found as  2𝜆𝑀 =   𝛾𝜉𝜆⇔   𝑀 = 𝛾𝜉2 .                                            (2.20) 
As in previous section, the result is straightforward, since the cedent’s relative retention 
depends on the reinsurer’s security loading, which, respectively, determines the reinsurer’s 
premium. Therefore, the higher the price of the risk transfer arrangement is, the higher 
proportion of risk will be retained by the direct insurer, i.e. the retention level and cost of 
reinsurance are in direct relation [11, p.248-250]. 
Hence, the obtained formulas of the optimal retention levels for cases of quota share and 
excess of loss reinsurance are likely to be quite similar in terms of their formulations. Namely, 
the only difference comes from the expected value and variance of insurer’s total claim 
amount, which is considered in the final expression of the retained proportion within the quota 
share contract. Such circumstance is objectively responding to the nature of the quota share 
agreement, as the one implying that the cedent will have to participate in the reimbursement 
of all claims arriving to the company in a fixed proportion. Therefore, the expected value and 
variability of the claim amount falling under the cedent’s responsibility are of considerable 
importance. 
2.3. The Further Analysis of Reinsurance Optimization Methodologies within the 
Classical Risk Process Framework 
The reinsurance operations, while aiming to limit the possible future losses of the direct 
insurer through the risk transfer mechanism, may influence on the company’s general 
performance in various ways both beneficial and unfavorable. Certain goals set by the direct 
insurer may be fulfilled by application of optimization procedure, i.e. it can maximize the 
desirable total wealth or minimize the variability of net profit after reimbursement of all 
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reinsurance related costs. However, the effect of reinsurance operations is much more 
extensive, hence it should be linked with more general indicators of the company’s efficiency.  
In order to estimate the effectiveness of reinsurance optimization methodology thoroughly the 
insurance company should analyze the possible outcomes with respect to some principal 
index characterizing the insurer’s performance. In this aspect the classical surplus process, as 
a basic generalization of the company’s performance, can be applied as a visualization of the 
company’s successfulness on the market. Indeed, the reinsurance operations and the slope of 
the surplus trajectory are directly related.  
As mentioned in [13], the insurance company focuses on the impact that risk transfer 
instruments, such as reinsurance, have on the performance of insurers. While operating under 
the safety constraint, the company sets a target ruin probability (over a given time horizon), 
but if the firm cannot meet this level of insolvency risk (with a given strategy), then it must 
take steps to reduce the amount of risk in its portfolio and a natural technique is to purchase 
reinsurance. Moreover, reinsurance is able to offer additional underwriting capacity for 
cedents and also to reduce the probability of a direct insurer's ruin [7]. 
Since reinsurance plays an important role in reducing the risk in an insurance portfolio, the 
question of the optimal parameters of reinsurance contract may be studied through a classical 
risk process. Namely, the insurance company aims to stay solvent, i.e. to maintain the surplus 
trend on the positive side, therefore the goal of optimization procedure is to estimate the most 
reasonable retention level in terms of decreasing the probability of company’s surplus process 
to ruin. Hence, the optimization problem can be extended and formulated as follows: the 
estimation of the optimal retention level with respect to insurer’s positive surplus process. 
Therefore, the aim is to find the optimization mechanism, i.e. setting a proportional or a non-
proportional reinsurance treaty with optimal retained proportion of the risk, such that the 
general risk process will maintain the positive slope. Thus the reasonableness of optimization 
approaches can be experimentally determined through the impact of reinsurance activity on 
company’s risk of ruin, i.e. on the intersection of two broad fields of insurance studies – 
optimization of reinsurance activity and insurer’s ruin analysis.  
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3. INVESTIGATION OF THE OPTIMIZATION METHODOLOGIES THROUGH 
THEIR IMPACT ON THE COMPANY’S SURPLUS PROCESS 
In order to evaluate the effect of reinsurance contracts determined with two analyzed 
optimization approaches on the risk process, consider the direct insurer providing motor 
insurance services. To illustrate both methodologies and to estimate their reasonableness in 
terms of influence they produce on the original surplus process of the cedent in the given 
conditions, simulated examples will be given, since the use of a real dataset is not possible 
due to the high confidentiality with which the insurance companies deal with their database.  
Considering that the main objective is to derive results to estimate the reasonableness of 
practical implementation of optimization technics, simulation process, which will represent 
the company's operational cycle, should be built up. The framework of the modeling of 
objective process representing cedent’s performance under a number of assumptions is the 
classical risk process possessing the following parameters:  
1) 𝑁(𝑡) is a random variable characterizing the number of claims up to time 𝑡, driven by 
a Poisson process with parameter 𝜆 (claim intensity). In the classical risk process the claim 
number {𝑁 𝑡 : 𝑡 ≥ 0} is supposed to represent the homogeneous Poisson process implying 
that claims are arriving with the constant intensity 𝜆 > 0 and the times between events are 
independent and identically distributed. However, the homogeneous Poisson process does not 
give a fully reasonable description of insurance reality, namely the assumption about the 
constant claim intensity over the whole period of insurer’s activity may be invalid, since 
frequency of claim occurrence is likely to depend on the time of the year [2].  
For modeling such phenomena the non-homogeneous Poisson process (NHPP) is more 
acceptable than the homogeneous one. The NHPP can be presented as a Poisson process with 
a variable intensity defined by the deterministic intensity function 𝜆(𝑡). In the special case 
when 𝜆(𝑡) takes the constant value 𝜆, the NHPP reduces to the homogeneous Poisson process 
with intensity [2].  
Therefore, in the further analysis claim severity will be generated using a non-homogeneous 
Poisson process with average intensities 𝜆!  for every month 𝑡 = 1,2,… ,12 depending on the 
given constant value of 𝜆,  namely: 
a) in January and February the average intensity is estimated with the function   𝜆! = 1.2𝜆 −3𝑡, where  𝑡 is 1 and 2 respectively; 
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b) from March to June the average intensity is fixed, i.e. 𝜆! = 𝜆 = 60 for 𝑡 = 3,… , 6; 
c) in July and August the jump in claim arrival severity is observed, the mean intensity is 
defined as 𝜆! = 1.1𝜆 + 𝑡, with 𝑡 equal to 7 and 8 respectively; 
d) in September and October the average claim arrival intensity retains a constant level 𝜆! = 𝜆 = 60,  for 𝑡 = 9 and 𝑡 = 10 respectively; 
e) in November and December the frequency starts to enlarge and is described with the 
function 𝜆! = 𝜆 + 3𝑡, where 𝑡 is 11 and 12 respectively; 
2) 𝑋!    𝑖 = 1, 2,… ,𝑁(𝑡)   are independent and identically distributed random variables 
denoting individual claim sizes in the insurance portfolio. To generate the claim severity for 
the case of motor insurance it may be suitable to attribute a lognormal distribution being 
realistic within the given type of insurance activity. For instance, in collision situations, where 
the individual claim values can increase almost without limits but nevertheless cannot fall 
below zero; 
3) durations between consecutive claim arrival times are independent random variables; 
4) claim size is independent of the claim arrival process. 
3.1. Formulation of the Surplus Process Simulation Model 
In order to perform the analysis of two possible retention estimation approaches applied to 
quota share and excess of loss reinsurance, the company’s surplus simulation model should be 
composed. The previously stated assumptions of the classical risk process will be fulfilled 
within the model and specified below parameters will be considered in all examined 
reinsurance optimization cases. 
Firstly, consider the cedent performing motor insurance activity over a period of twelve 
month  (𝑡 = 12)  under the following fixed parameters: 
! initial capital at time 𝑡 = 0 is equal to 0, i.e. 𝑢 = 0; 
! average individual claim size follows the log-normal distribution with mean  𝜇 = 6.5 
and standard deviation 𝜎 = 1,  hence the average value of individual claim according to 
the formula of expected value of log-normally distributed random variable, can be 
determined as 
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𝐸 𝑋 = 𝑒!!!!!   ≈ 1096 units; 
! premium loading factor is 𝜑 is constant (𝜑 = 10%) and total premium charged by the 
cedent is calculated with the expected value principle, i.e. 𝑃 = (1+ 𝜑)𝐸 𝑋 . 
! the fixed intensity parameter 𝜆  representing the normal mean of claim arrival 
frequency is equal to 60 (𝜆 = 60). In the following surplus process simulation it will be 
referred to, when estimating the average intensity of non-homogeneous Poisson process 
for every 𝑡 = 1,2,… ,12. 
Secondly, the claim intensity is modeled in the following way: 
! for every month 𝑡  (𝑡 = 1,2,… ,12) the average claim arrival intensity 𝜆!  is defined 
according to the previously described non-homogeneous Poisson process 𝑁 𝑡 ; 
! actual number of claims 𝑁 𝑡 − 𝑁(𝑡 − 1) = 𝑛! for 𝑡 = 1,2,… ,12  is generated from a 
Poisson distribution with the expected intensity 𝐸 𝑁 𝑡 = 𝜆!  of a particular month. 
Since the operation period of one year is considered, the surplus amount will be estimated by 
the end of every month. Taking into account that at 𝑡 = 0   we have 𝑅! = 𝑢 = 0 , for 𝑡 = 1,2,… ,12 the value of the surplus process can be formulated as 
𝑅! = 𝑅!!! + 𝑃! − 𝑋! ,!!!!!                                                   (3.1) 
where  
1) 𝑃! = 𝜆!(1+ 𝜑)𝐸[𝑋]  is the total premium received by the cedent during the month 𝑡.  Since premiums are charged in advance the expected claim intensity 𝐸 𝑁 𝑡 = 𝜆! 
is considered in their estimation. 
2) 𝑋! = 𝑋!     !!!!! is the total amount of claims incurred within month 𝑡  with 𝑋!   being 
identically distributed random individual claims from log-normal distribution and 𝑛!  an actual number of claims over the month 𝑡  for all 𝑡 = 1,2,… , 12. 
The simulation of the surplus process can be performed using Monte Carlo approach [19, 
p.96-105] with the number of iterations 𝑘 = 100000. Then for 𝑗 = 1,2,… , 𝑘 the terminal 
value of the surplus process 𝑅  at  𝑡 = 𝑇 = 12  will be: 𝑅!! = 𝑅!!!! + 𝑃!! − 𝑋!! .!!!!!                                                 (3.2) 
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Based on the end values 𝑅!!   (𝑗 = 1,2,… , 𝑘) independently generated company’s surplus paths 
a number of indicators can be computed in order to evaluate the final result of cedent’s 
operations within one year period under specified conditions. Namely: 
! the mean of terminal values over 𝑗 = 1,2… 𝑘 iterations: 𝑅! = !! 𝑅!!!!!! ;             (3.3) 
! the standard deviation of 𝑅!:   𝑠(𝑅!) = 𝐸 (𝑅!! − 𝐸 𝑅! )! ;               (3.4) 
! a set of specific indexes, e.g. quantiles, absolute differences based on the obtained 
selection of terminal values of surplus processes, which will be determined specifically 
for each particular case.  
3.2. Proportional Reinsurance Agreement 
In case of direct insurer setting a proportional reinsurance agreement with retention level 𝛽 
and the reinsurer’s share of responsibility is 1− 𝛽 , the cedent’s surplus process obtains the 
following formulation:   𝑅!! = 𝑅!!!! + 𝑃!! − 𝛽𝑋!!!!!! ,                                            (3.5) 
where 𝑃!! = 𝛽𝑃!  is the direct insurer’s net premium less the reinsurer’s share of total 
premiums collected over period. Given formula of the surplus process constitutes the basis of 
generation of surplus process for the case of quota share contract assuming reinsurance 
parameters stipulated by both utility and net profit variance minimization methodologies.  
The underlying measures of the reasonableness of implementation of particular retention 
optimization methodology under the formulated conditions of cedent’s activity will be: 
a) Conclusions concerning changes caused in the general risk process with setting the 
proportional reinsurance agreement under certain retention level optimization approach, 
which can be traced through the comparison of the average surplus process trajectories 𝑅! ,𝑅   based on values {𝑅!! , 𝑡 = 1,2,… ,12}  and {𝑅! , 𝑡 = 1,2,… ,12} respectively. Since the 
simulation is exercised over 𝑘 iterations, the previously defined average processes can be 
determined as:  
𝑅! = !! 𝑅!!" ,… ,!!!! !! 𝑅!"!"   !!!!  and  𝑅 = !! 𝑅!! ,… ,!!!! !! 𝑅!"!   !!!!   respectively.                              (3.6) 
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Here it will be considered that both pairs of risk processes are taking the same random log-
normally distributed claim amounts 𝑋! and claim intensities from non-homogeneous Poisson 
process 𝜆! for all 𝑡 = 1,2,… ,12, i.e. both average trajectories are based on common stochastic 
process. 
Since the principal purpose is to trace the changes in the original surplus process under certain 
reinsurance treaty applied, the case when the original surplus path goes negative is of 
particular interest in terms of the effect of the settled contract. As the average trajectories 𝑅! ,𝑅   are expected to maintain positive slope due to specified conditions of the model, to 
investigate the behavior of reinsured risk process more precisely, the analysis of all individual 
trajectories can be considered. Therefore, the pattern of behavior of 𝑘  individual generated 
surplus paths with and without the quota share treaty will be visualized with the respective 
graphs 𝑅!" , 𝑗 = 1,2,… , 𝑘  and 𝑅! , 𝑗 = 1,2,… , 𝑘 . 
b) To consider alterations in the reinsured surplus process caused by the changes in 
parameters of reinsurance agreement, the set of indexes based on terminal values {𝑅!!" , 𝑗 =1,2… 𝑘} and  {𝑅!! , 𝑗 = 1,2… 𝑘}  can be computed. As the generation process for every iteration 𝑗 = 1,2… 𝑘 returns a pair of terminal values {𝑅!!" ,𝑅!! } corresponding to reinsured and pure 
trajectory respectively, both based on the same stochastic process, the changes of surplus 
paths under different conditions of reinsurance agreement can be traced by adjusting the 
generation procedure to several retention parameters, namely the extended output of the 
generator will be of the form {𝑅!!!! ,𝑅!!!! …   𝑅!!!! ,𝑅!! } where 𝑠 is number of different values 
of   𝛽  ( 𝛽 = {𝛽!,𝛽!,…𝛽!} ) computed under the examined methodology by changing 
determinant parameters of retention level. For the examined case 𝑠 = 7.  Since the simulation 
outputs are comparable in terms of random inputs and taking into account the dependence of 
retention parameter 𝛽 and consequently the whole reinsured surplus path on the particular 
fixed parameters, their impact will be studied separately under the assumption that if one 
factor varies, another stays constant. 
c) The probability of the reinsured surplus trajectories to go negative (𝑃 𝑅! < 0 ) and 
the respective parameter for non-reinsurance case 𝑃 𝑅 < 0   will be computed as: 
! 𝑃 𝑅! < 0 = !!    𝐼 !!!"!!!!!!   for all 𝛽 = 𝛽!,𝛽!,…𝛽! , 
! 𝑃 𝑅 < 0 = !!    𝐼 !!!!!!!!! .                                                                                      (3.7) 
The comparison of the defined probabilities will be considered as well. 
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3.2.1. Utility Maximization Approach 
Under the methodology of maximizing utility of direct insurer, the retention proportion is 
estimated with the formula 𝛽 = 𝜂𝜂 + 𝛼, 
hence the share of risk kept by the cedent is influenced by two parameters: the reinsurer’s 
premium loading factor 𝜂 and is the direct insurer’s risk aversion coefficient 𝛼. Since both 
these factors are assumed to be known by the direct insurer, cession rate can be estimated 
directly. 
The changes caused in the surplus process after implementing the quota share contract under 
utility approach can be visualized with the following graph: 
 
Figure 1: 𝑅! ,𝑅  with utility approach applied Figure 2: Individual reinsured trajectories 𝑅!"and 
non-reinsured 𝑅!, 𝑗 = 1,2,… , 𝑘 𝜂 = 0.1,𝛼 = 0.2,𝛽 = 33.33%  
The result obtained with the formula (3.6) illustrates the significant difference between the 
average pure 𝑅   and reinsured 𝑅!    surplus processes, namely 𝑅!  represents much smaller 
positive slope due to the fact that claims incurred by the cedent within the analyzed period are 
shared with reinsuring party in the same proportion as premiums collected, therefore the 
trajectory with settled quota share contract simply constitutes a certain percentage of the 
original process, equal to the retained proportion of underlying risk.  
The selections of 𝑘 individual trajectories for both reinsured and original case show, that the 
quota share contract operates as a risk reduction mechanism and prevent sharp decreases of 
the company’s surplus in case the risk process obtains negative trend. Retention level 𝛽  being 
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the underlying parameter of treaty defines the possible slope of the individual reinsured 
trajectories by specifying the proportion of underlying risks kept by the cedent, i.e. share of 
obtained losses retained within the cedent’s responsibility. Consequently, the range of 
generated surplus reinsured paths appears to be much more narrow, stipulating a better 
predictability of operations and avoidance of severe losses.  
The character of dependence between the retained amount of risk and parameters 𝜂 and 𝛼 is 
investigated on the basis of 𝑘 independent surplus paths for every 𝛽 = {𝛽!,𝛽!,…𝛽!} and non-
reinsurance scenario by applying formulas (3.3) and (3.4). 
η 𝛽 Characteristics of the terminal value of reinsured surplus process (𝑅!!) 𝑅!! 𝑠(𝑅!!) 
0.1 0.3333 30135 17547 
0.11 0.3548 32079 18679 
0.12 0.3750 33902 19740 
0.13 0.3939 35614 20737 
0.14 0.4118 37225 21676 
0.15 0.4286 38745 22561 
0.2 0.5000 45202 26321 
Table 1. The impact of reinsurance premium loading factor 𝜂 (𝛼 = 0.2)  
𝛼 𝛽 Characteristics of the terminal value of reinsured surplus process (𝑅!!) 𝑅!! 𝑠(𝑅!!) 
0.01 0.9091 82979 47470 
0.02 0.8333 76064 43514 
0.03 0.7692 70213 40167 
0.04 0.7143 65198 37298 
0.05 0.6667 60851 34811 
0.1 0.5000 45639 26108 
0.2 0.3333 30426 17406 
Table 2. The impact of the cedent’s risk aversion α   (𝜂 = 0.1)   
From the obtained results it can be concluded, that the expected value of the selection {𝑅𝑇𝛽𝑗} is 
an increasing function of the retention level 𝛽. This pattern of dependence is observed due to 
the fact of proportionality in splitting both incurred claims and total underlying premium 
between initial insurer and reinsurer leading to the respective decrease in the cedent’s net 
revenue amount by the percentage of risk transferred to reinsuring party.  
In the first case, while the retention rate grows as the price of reinsurance contract represented 
by factor 𝜂 increases, the mean of surplus amount along with the standard deviation of the 
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terminal values grows proportionally proving that proportion 𝛽  influences expected surplus 
quantity directly. The same effect appears in the second case. As cedent’s share of risk 𝛽 
declines with the raise of its absolute risk aversion, the mean of end values of surplus paths 
decreases and the standard deviation of examined selection decreases consequently.  
However, the probability that surplus processes acquire negative values 𝑃 𝑅! < 0 ,  for all 𝛽 = 𝛽!,𝛽!,…𝛽! ) and 𝑃 𝑅 < 0  (see formula 3.7) are the same, namely 𝑃 𝑅! < 0 =   𝑃 𝑅 < 0 ≈ 4.7  %  for all 𝛽 = {𝛽!,𝛽!,…𝛽!}. 
Therefore, the alterations in the cession rate under the proportional reinsurance agreement did 
not influence the general trend of the company’s risk process. The quota share agreement in 
case of utility approach applied to retention estimation indeed does not reduce the probability 
of cedent’s surplus process to ruin, but lessen amount of loss incurred. 
3.2.2. Net Profit Variance Minimization Approach 
The second approach to the estimation of retention parameter 𝛽 implies that retained share of 
risk can be computed as 𝛽 = 𝛾𝜉𝐸 𝑆2𝑉𝑎𝑟 𝑆 . 
According to the mathematical formulation within the analyzed methodology the risk 
proportion 𝛽  operates with the reinsurer’s security loading 𝜉  referred to in the premium 
calculations, a variable 𝛾 from the Lagrange multiplier method, expected value and variance 
of total claim amount 𝑆.  
The only unknown factor of the given formulation of the retention proportion is Lagrange 
variable 𝛾, since the remaining parameters are considered to be known or can be derived from 
generated data. Namely, premium loading factor 𝜉 is assumed to be fixed by the reinsuring 
party, the mean value 𝐸 𝑆   and variance 𝑉𝑎𝑟 𝑆   of total claim amount can be computed 
directly from the Compound Poisson distribution of 𝑆   (with log-normally distributed 
individual claims 𝑋! , 𝑖 = 1, 2,… ,𝑁(𝑡)). 
Since the underlying idea of the given methodology is that variance of net profit 𝑉𝑎𝑟 𝑁𝑃 𝛽  
is a subject to a fixed target level of expected net profit 𝐸 𝑁𝑃 𝛽 , the parameter 𝛾  can be 
estimated from formula (2.10) by setting it equal to some constant 𝑐 (target level of expected 
net profit): 
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𝑃 − 1− 𝜉𝛽 + 𝜉 𝐸 𝑆 = 𝑐. 
From the expression of retention level (2.13) it follows that 𝛾𝜉𝐸 𝑆2𝑉𝑎𝑟 𝑆 = 𝑐 − 𝑃 + 𝐸 𝑆 (1+ 𝜉)𝜉𝐸[𝑆] . 
Considering that in the given equation all arguments except parameter 𝛾 are known, the 
formula of Lagrange variable can be expressed in the following way 
𝛾 = 2 𝑐−𝑃+𝐸 𝑆 1+𝜉 𝑉𝑎𝑟[𝑆]𝜉2𝐸[𝑆]2 .                                              (3.8) 
The changes in the trend of the cedent’s general surplus process under quota share contract 
with 𝛽  determined by net profit variance minimization approach can be visualized similarly to 
the case of utility approach, namely by generating a pair of average trajectories 𝑅! ,𝑅    applying the formula (3.6) and through the comparison of the selection of 𝑘 
individual reinsured 𝑅!"  and pure 𝑅!  trajectories ( 𝑗 = 1,2,… , 𝑘).  The obtained average 
surplus paths are:  
 
Figure 3: 𝑅! ,𝑅  with net profit variance 
minimization approach applied 
Figure 4: Individual reinsured trajectories 𝑅!"and 
non-reinsured 𝑅!, 𝑗 = 1,2,… , 𝑘 𝜉 = 0.1, 𝑐 = 30000,𝛽 = 32.92%  
The obtained results are similar to the utility approach case with the slight difference in the 
scope of direct insurer’s responsibility. As the net profit variance minimization approach 
implies lower level of 𝛽  that the previously examined methodology under the same given 
conditions, the average path 𝑅!   represents the smaller percentage of the original trajectory 𝑅  , 
in general repeating its slope. 
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The individual paths 𝑅!" and 𝑅!   verified that the intensity of losses in case of reinsurance 
contract settled is smaller due to the fact that claim amount only in the share 𝛽 falls within the 
direct insurer’s responsibility.  Due to the fact that in the case of variance minimization 
approach the estimated retention rate is almost equal to the one derived with the utility 
technique, the extent of reduction in the surplus amount is the same as in previous case.  
The influence of changes in retention parameter 𝛽  on the risk process under quota share 
agreement can be investigated with assumption that reinsurer’s premium loading factor 𝜉 and 
fixed level of desirable net profit 𝑐 are the underlying impact factors determining 𝛾  parameter 
(see formula 3.8) and consequently retention level 𝛽.  
The results of simulations (see formulas 3.3 and 3.4) are the following: 
𝜉 𝛾 𝛽 Characteristics of the terminal value of reinsured surplus process (𝑅!!) 𝑅!! 𝑠(𝑅!!) 
0.1 41777303 0.3292 29893 17000 
0.11 45014781 0.3902 35430 20149 
0.12 46637824 0.4410 40045 22774 
0.13 47247958 0.4840 43949 24994 
0.14 47214097 0.5209 47296 26898 
0.15 46768984 0.5528 50197 28547 
0.2 42170781 0.6646 60349 34320 
Table 3. The impact of reinsurer’s premium factor 𝜉  (𝑐 = 30000 units) 
𝑐 𝛾 𝛽 Characteristics of the terminal value of reinsured surplus process (𝑅!!) 𝑅!! 𝑠(𝑅!!) 
5000 3493616 0.0549 5053 2818 
10000 6987232 0.1097 10107 5637 
15000 10480847 0.1646 15160 8455 
20000 13974463 0.2195 20213 11274 
25000 17468079 0.2743 25267 14092 
30000 20961695 0.3292 30320 16911 
35000 24455310 0.3841 35373 19729 
Table 4. The impact of expected amount of net profit 𝑐 (𝜉 = 0.1)   
So, in case when the net profit variance minimization approach is applied to the calculation of 
the cession rate, retention parameter 𝛽  appears to be an increasing function of reinsurer’s 
premium loading factor 𝜉 and desirable level of net profit 𝑐.  The alterations of the first factor 
imply the same changes in the retained share of risk as in the case of utility approach while 
the increasing desirable level of net profit stipulates the cedent to keep a bigger share of 
	   35	  
expected surplus volume and consequently to implement the bigger reinsurance retention 
proportion 𝛽. 
The expected average surplus amount  𝑅!! is directly related to the retention parameter  𝛽, 
consequently an increase of cedent’s retention level objectively implies a higher share of 
expected surplus amount of original risk process pertaining to the cedent. In particular, in the 
examined model original risk process maintains growing tendency and the average surplus 
amount increase proportionally to the rise of retention rate. However, if the pure surplus 
process ruins the reinsured path will go below zero as well, but less severely protecting the 
initial insurer against significant losses. Hence the proportional reinsurance contract does not 
eliminate the probability of ruin from the initial insurer’s activity, but decline the amount of 
loss incurred in case surplus path goes negative in all cases. 
The probabilities 𝑃 𝑅! < 0  and 𝑃 𝑅 < 0  following from formula (3.7) maintain the same 
value under all assumed levels of 𝛽  and in the case without the reinsurance treaty, namely 
𝑃 𝑅! < 0 =   𝑃 𝑅 < 0 = 4.4  %  for all 𝛽 = {𝛽!,𝛽!,…𝛽!}. 
Hence, the results of application of net profit variance minimization approach confirmed that 
the general trend of insurer’s surplus path remains constant despite the cession rate varies, i.e. 
alterations in the amount of cedent’s responsibility cannot effect direct insurer’s financial 
performance fundamentally under all other conditions staying the same. 
3.3. Non-Proportional Reinsurance Agreement 
In case of non-proportional reinsurance contract with the threshold 𝑀 > 0 the surplus process 
of the insurance company obtains the following form: 
𝑅!! = 𝑅!!!! + 𝑃!! − min 𝑋! ,𝑀 .!!!!!                                         (3.9) 
One of the questions arising when setting an excess of loss reinsurance contract is the 
methodology of sharing of gross premium (𝑃!) at time 𝑡 = 1,2… 12 between the initial 
insurer and reinsurer. Unlike a quota share agreement, for the non-proportional case there is 
no single rule of premium allocation under the reinsurance arrangement, therefore this issue is 
typically negotiated by parties and respective conditions are fixed in the contract. The 
methodology guiding the premium spreading process depends on certain principles accepted 
in the insurance and reinsurance practice. One of the most widely used is so called “Swing 
Rating” approach, according to which premium of the reinsurer varies with loss ratio [14]. 
	   36	  
The loss ratio of the reinsurer is directly related to the share of ceded risk and can be 
expressed as the expected total amount of claims under reinsurance multiplied by the 
reinsurer’s premium loading factor  (2.14), for all 𝑡 = 1,2… 12. Consequently, the cedent’s 
premium 𝑃!!   under excess of loss contract can be estimated simply as a difference between 
the total premium volume (assuming a given premium loading factor 𝜑) and the part of the 
premium transferred to the reinsuring party: 𝑃!! = 𝑃! − 1+ 𝜉 𝐸 𝑆! = 𝑃! − 1+ 𝜉 𝜆!𝐸 𝑍  = 𝜆! 1+ 𝜑 𝐸 𝑋 − 𝜆! 1+ 𝜉 𝐸 𝑋 − 𝐸 𝑌                              (3.10) 
In order to evaluate the reasonableness of implementation of particular retention optimization 
methodology in case of excess of loss agreement, the following results will be estimated and 
considered: 
a) The comparison between the average 𝑅! ,𝑅    non-reinsurance and reinsured 
trajectories  generated from 𝑗 = 1,2… 𝑘 independent Monte-Carlo iterations can be executed, 
considering that: 
1) 𝑅! = !! 𝑅!!",… ,!!!! !! 𝑅!"!"   !!!!  represents average path of reinsured surplus 
process; 
2) 𝑅 = !! 𝑅!! ,… ,!!!! !! 𝑅!"!   !!!!  reflects average path of non-reinsured surplus 
process.                                                                                                                 (3.11) 
The selection of random reinsured trajectories   {𝑅!" , 𝑗 = 1,2,… , 𝑘}  and original ones {𝑅! , 𝑗 = 1,2,… , 𝑘} will be generated to illustrate the behavior and the frequency of  individual 
paths going negative with and without reinsurance cover.  
b) The investigation of the behavior of selection or terminal values of 𝑘  independent 
surplus processes generated in case when the excess of loss reinsurance contract is settled 𝑅!!" , 𝑗 = 1,2… 𝑘   and in case of pure surplus process 𝑅!! , 𝑗 = 1,2… 𝑘  applying (3.3), (3.4). 
c) The probability of the average reinsured surplus trajectories to go negative can be 
evaluated as 𝑃 𝑅! < 0 = !!    𝐼 !!!"!!!!!!   for all 𝑀 = 𝑀!,𝑀!,…   𝑀! ,              (3.12) 
The given probability will be compared with the respective parameter of the original surplus 
process (3.7), for all 𝑀 = 𝑀!,𝑀!,…   𝑀! . 
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3.3.1. Utility Maximization Approach  
In case the direct insurer refers to utility approach when estimating its retention under the 
excess of loss agreement, the threshold can be computed in the following way:  
𝑀 = 1𝛼 log 1+ 𝜉 , 
implying that level 𝑀  depends on two factors: reinsurer’s premium loading factor 𝜉  and direct 
insurer’s absolute risk aversion parameter 𝛼.   Both indexes are assumed to be known by the 
cedent and remain fixed over the whole analyzed year.  
Considering that under the excess of loss agreement the principle of sharing responsibility for 
compensation of claims does not infer proportionality, the consequences of operation with the 
excess of loss agreement settled may vary depending on the claim size and frequency: high 
claim intensity with small average amount can result in ruin of insurer, while the same claim 
arrival stochastic process can remain on the positive side without the reinsurance cover.  
The relation between average pure 𝑅  and reinsured 𝑅!   paths under given threshold estimation 
methodology, as well as the selection of 𝑘  individual trajectories 𝑅!"  and 𝑅! ,   can be 
visualized in the following way: 
 
Figure 5: 𝑅! ,𝑅  with utility approach applied  Figure 6: Individual reinsured trajectories 𝑅!"and non-reinsured 𝑅!, 𝑗 = 1,2,… , 𝑘 𝜉 = 0.1,𝛼 = 0.2,𝑀 = 523  units  
Unlike the case of quota share agreement, excess of loss surplus trajectory posses higher 
independency from the original one, since the relation between them is determined by the 
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maximum limit of claim payable by cedent (𝑀). The generated over 𝑘  iterations average 
trajectories 𝑅! ,𝑅  verify that in general excess of loss treaty under the net profit variance 
minimization approach support the positive trend of surplus trajectory, however the slope of 
average reinsured path is smaller due to the outflow of the particular share of underlying 
premium resulting from setting the reinsurance contract. 
The selection of the individual 𝑘  paths proves that the excess of loss agreement settled under 
utility approach generally reduces the boundaries of the individual surplus trajectories both 
from the positive and negative side, defining the area of possible financial outcomes in case 
the treaty is applied. Consequently, the expected losses of the direct insurer are lessened and 
the surplus paths with the reinsurance cover are secured against severe claims, however in 
case of positive outcome by the end of the analyzed period the financial result in absolute 
value is expected to be smaller in case when the reinsurance agreement is settled due to the 
expenses associated with purchasing of the treaty. 
The influence of the reinsurer’s loading factor 𝜉  and the absolute risk aversion 𝛼 on the 
threshold 𝑀  (with respect to formulas 3.3 and 3.4) can be investigated as follows: 
𝜉 𝑀 Characteristics of the terminal value of surplus process (𝑅!!) Comparison of 𝑅!! and 𝑅! 𝑅!! − 𝑅! 𝑠(𝑅!!)𝑠(𝑅!)  𝑅!! 𝑠(𝑅!!) 
0.1 523 35532 13090 -55666 0.2510 
0.11 572 32598 14060 -58600 0.2696 
0.12 621 29946 14979 -61252 0.2872 
0.13 670 27548 15852 -63651 0.3040 
0.14 718 25374 16684 65824 0.3199 
0.15 766 23403 17477 -67795 0.3351 
0.2 1000 15967 20943 -75231 0.4015 
Table 5. The impact of reinsurance premium loading factor 𝜉 (𝛼 = 0.2)   
𝛼 𝑀 Characteristics of the terminal value of surplus process (𝑅!!) Comparison of 𝑅!! and 𝑅! 𝑅!! − 𝑅! 𝑠(𝑅!!)𝑠(𝑅!)  𝑅!! 𝑠(𝑅!!) 
0.01 10452 77410 49225 -12954 0.9318 
0.02 5226 79264 43748 -11100 0.8282 
0.03 3484 75370 38947 -14994 0.7373 
0.04 2613 70706 35026 -19658 0.6631 
0.05 2090 66066 31789 -24298 0.6018 
0.1 1045 51333 21623 -39031 0.4093 
0.2 522 33632 13058 -56732 0.2472 
Table 6. The impact of the cedent’s risk aversion 𝛼 (𝜉 = 0.1) 
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The obtained simulation results stipulates two underlying conclusion regarding the 
dependence of the surplus process on the threshold 𝑀 through the initial parameters, namely: 
1) In case the reinsurer’s loading factor 𝜉 is growing the threshold 𝑀 increase as well as 
the price of reinsurance treaty, i.e. reinsurer’s premium, becomes higher. However, the 
premium retained by the cedent (3.10) is the increasing function of 𝑀 and decreasing with 
respect to 𝜉,  implying that the expected value of terminal values of the surplus process 𝑅!!will 
decrease with the increase of 𝜉.   This result appears to be straightforward, since even despite 
high threshold, i.e. small share of risks is transferred, the premium payable for reinsurance 
cover will increase considerably with the increase of loading factor 𝜉.  Therefore, the standard 
deviation of the selection of terminal values 𝑠(𝑅!!) will grow due to the higher maximum 
limit of claims payable by cedent resulting in more significant fluctuations of amounts of 
incurred claims.  
2) In the second case with cedent’s risk aversion being variable the threshold is 
naturally a decreasing function of 𝛼, implying that the direct insurer tends to minimize the 
limit of its responsibility in order to avoid risk of losses. As the loading factor 𝜉 is considered 
to stay constant the premium retained by the cedent is effected only by the amount of 𝑀  an, 
consequently the expected value 𝑅!! decreases as the share of risk transferred to the reinsurer 
enlarges, implying bigger premium outflow. However, the standard deviation of the selection 𝑠(𝑅!!) behaves conversely to the first case, namely lower threshold induces lower fluctuations 
of claim amount, which appears to be quite intuitive as 𝑀  is the absolute limit of claims 
payable by the cedent and if arriving claims exceed the threshold the sum payable by the 
direct insurer will be equal to the threshold itself. 
Following from formula (3.12) the probabilities of 𝑅!  with 𝑀 = 𝑀!,𝑀!,…   𝑀!    to go 
negative are: 
Impact of 𝜉 (𝛼 = 0.2) Impact of 𝛼 (𝜉 = 0.1) 𝜉 𝑀 𝑃 𝑅! < 0 ,% 𝑃{𝑅! < 0}𝑃{𝑅 < 0}  𝛼 𝑀 𝑃 𝑅! < 0 ,% 𝑃{𝑅! < 0}𝑃{𝑅 < 0}  
0.1 523 0.39 0.0852 0.01 10452 3.15 0.703 
0.11 572 1.05 0.2293 0.02 5226 2.25 0.502 
0.12 621 2.59 0.5655 0.03 3484 1.70 0.380 
0.13 670 4.53 0.9891 0.04 2613 1.40 0.313 
0.14 718 6.48 1.4148 0.05 2090 1.17 0.261 
0.15 766 9.08 1.9825 0.1 1045 0.64 0.144 
0.2 1000 22.00 4.8035 0.2 522 0.41 0.091 
Table 7. The probability of reinsured surplus process to go negative in case of excess of loss contract 
with utility approach applied 
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From the simulation results it follows that the probability of the surplus process to ruin 
increase with the growth of the threshold. The distribution of the actual claim amount is of the 
prime importance in this aspect due to the fact that, when setting a low threshold the limit of 
insurer’s responsibility will be also low and excessive claims will be payable in the amount of 𝑀, while under the higher threshold most of incurred claims will be payable by the cedent in 
the full volume, inducing a large aggregate claim sum. In this case despite the retained 
premium is an increasing function of 𝑀 the cedent’s premium may be not sufficient to cover 
incurred losses. Moreover, if to consider the situation when 𝜉 grows, the ruin probability 
enlarge much severely in this case, since the outgoing reinsurance premium flow will be 
increased considerably by the growing loading factor (the respective probability of the 
original process is exceeded four times in case when 𝜉 is twice bigger than the cedent’s 
loading 𝜑), therefore 𝜉 appears to be indeed crucial parameter when evaluating the excess of 
loss contract. 
3.3.2. Net Profit Variance Minimization Approach 
The threshold 𝑀 with net premium minimization approach in case of excess of loss contract 
can be derived using the following formula: 𝑀 = 𝛾𝜉2 , 
taking 𝜉 and 𝛾  as determinative parameters. To estimate the amount of underlying gross 
premium 𝑃!! , retained with direct insurer after setting the reinsurance contract for all 𝑡, the 
same approach as in case of utility retention level estimation methodology will be considered 
(3.10).   
The formula of the threshold  implies the dependence of 𝑀 on the parameter 𝛾 of the Lagrange 
multiplier method. Since variable 𝛾  is unknown, it can be computed based on assumption that 
initial insurer fixes a desirable level of net profit 𝑐, hence 𝑉𝑎𝑟[𝑁𝑃 𝑀 ] is a subject to this 
suitable constraint.  
From formula (2.17) follows that the expected value of cedent’s net revenue can be expressed 
as 𝐸 𝑁𝑃 𝑀 = 𝑃 − 1+ 𝜉 𝐸 𝑆 + 𝜉𝐸[𝑆!]. 
Since individual claim amounts are log-normally distributed with known mean 𝜇 and standard 
deviation 𝜎,  𝐸 𝑆  can be computed directly as 𝐸 𝑆 = ( 𝜆!!!!! )𝐸[𝑋]  and total premium 
charged can be defined in the similar way: 𝑃 = 1+ 𝜑 [ 𝜆!!!!! 𝐸 𝑋 ]. Hence, the only 
unknown argument of the formula is 𝐸 𝑆! ,  depending on the threshold 𝑀. Applying the 
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limited expected value function of log-normal distribution [12, p.229] and considering the 
target level of 𝐸 𝑁𝑃 𝑀  to be equal to 𝑐, the following expression is obtained: 
𝑃 − 1+ 𝜉 𝐸 𝑆 + 𝜉 𝜆!!!!! ∙ 𝑒!!!!! ∙Φ ln 𝑀 − 𝜇 − 𝜎!𝜎 +𝑀 ∙ 1−Φ ln 𝑀 − 𝜇𝜎 = 𝑐. 
Assuming that 𝑀 = 𝛾𝜉2   and by setting the previously defined expression to zero (reducing it to 
the problem of finding of one dimensional root) the parameter 𝛾 can be derived.  
 
Figure 7: 𝑅! ,𝑅  with net profit variance 
minimization approach applied 
Figure 8: Individual reinsured trajectories 𝑅!"and non-reinsured 𝑅!, 𝑗 = 1,2,… , 𝑘 
(𝜉 = 0.1, 𝑐 = 30000,𝑀 = 416  units) 
The implementation of net profit minimization approach to the non-proportional treaty 
generally brings in the same alterations in the cedent’s surplus path as in case of utility 
approach. The principal difference of the net profit variance reduction approach similarly to 
the case of proportional reinsurance is in the scale of retention parameter, since under the 
defined parameters the threshold in the current case is 20  %  smaller than the respective 
parameter estimated with utility approach, however the behavior of the average reinsured path 
comparing to the original one remains the same as with previous optimization methodology. 
The range of individual trajectories 𝑅!" and 𝑅  !  in case of net profit variance minimization 
approach implies the same conclusions as in the case of utility methodology, despite the upper 
and lower bounds of the area of possible individual paths are more narrow due to the fact that 
current methodology stipulates lower retention level than the utility approach. Therefore, the 
overall impact of the non-proportional treaty on the cedent’s surplus process remains the 
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same, namely the losses are reduced along with the reduction of the profits, i.e. excess of loss 
treaty is reasonable in terms of securing the direct insurer against excessive losses. 
The dependence of threshold on 𝜉 and 𝑐, synthesized in Lagrange parameter 𝛾, can be traced 
by computing parameters (3.3), (3.4) and their further comparison: 
𝜉 𝛾 𝑀 Characteristics of the terminal value of surplus process (𝑅!!) Comparison of 𝑅!! and 𝑅! 𝑅!! − 𝑅! 𝑠(𝑅!!)𝑠(𝑅!)  𝑅!! 𝑠(𝑅!!) 
0.1 8325 416 29879 10851 -61131 0.2079 
0.11 9476 521 29858 13053 -61152 0.2501 
0.12 10341 620 29845 14974 -61165 0.2869 
0.13 11000 715 29840 16663 -61170 0.3193 
0.14 11506 805 29831 18157 -61179 0.3479 
0.15 11895 892 29827 19494 -61183 0.3735 
0.2 12820 1282 29818 24579 -61192 0.4709 
Table 8. The impact of reinsurance premium loading factor ξ  (c = 30000) 
𝑐 𝛾 𝑀 Characteristics of the terminal value of surplus process (𝑅!!) Comparison of 𝑅!! and 𝑅! 𝑅!! − 𝑅! 𝑠(𝑅!!)𝑠(𝑅!)  𝑅!! 𝑠(𝑅!!) 
5000 1206 60 4999 1741 -86267 0.0338 
10000 2439 122 10001 3490 -81266 0.0678 
15000 3736 187 15005 5263 -76262 0.1023 
20000 5129 256 20007 7071 -71260 0.1374 
25000 6648 332 24998 8923 -66269 0.1734 
30000 8325 416 29989 10824 -61278 0.2104 
35000 10200 510 34969 12780 -56298 0.2484 
Table 9. The impact of expected amount of net profit c (ξ = 0.1)   
Based on the simulated results the following conclusions can be formulated: 
1) Considering the case of the increasing premium loading factor 𝜉 and respectively 
growing threshold 𝑀 (based on the same arguments as in case of utility approach), the 
expected value of the selection of the terminal values of the surplus process 𝑅!!   presents a 
slight decrease with the raise of loading factor. Since the expected value is heavily dependent 
on the amount of retained premium, which decreases with the growth of 𝜉,  but increases as 𝑀 
enlarge, it can be concluded that despite the impact of these two factors the retained premium 
volume and amount of incurred claims remain balanced. The standard deviation of terminal 
values 𝑠(𝑅!!) increases with the growth of 𝜉, since the higher limit allows higher variance of 
the incurred claims, however still remains significantly smaller than the original level in non-
reinsurance  case. 
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2) In case when the cedent fixes higher level of expected net profit 𝑐 the threshold 
increases respectively, implying that the higher proportion of the total premium will be kept 
(since in the given case the alterations of the reinsurance premium depend only on changing 𝑐 
the effect of 𝜉  is eliminated). Consequently, both the expected value 𝑅!!  and standard 
deviation 𝑠 𝑅!!  are growing. 
Following from formula (3.11) the probabilities of reinsured surplus process 𝑅! to obtain 
negative values (considering all 𝑀 = 𝑀!,𝑀!,…   𝑀!  with either 𝜉 or 𝑐 staying constant)  are: 
Impact of 𝜉, 𝑐 = 30000 Impact of 𝑐, 𝜉 = 0.1 𝜉 𝑀 𝑃 𝑅! < 0 ,% 𝑃{𝑅! < 0}𝑃{𝑅 < 0}  𝑐 𝑀 𝑃{𝑅! < 0},% 𝑃{𝑅! < 0}𝑃{𝑅 < 0}  
0.1 416 0.24 0.0550 5000 60 0.34 0.0767 
0.11 521 1.06 0.2431 10000 122 0.35 0.0790 
0.12 620 2.26 0.5183 15000 187 0.35 0.0790 
0.13 715 3.64 0.8349 20000 256 0.38 0.0858 
0.14 805 5.03 1.1537 25000 332 0.42 0.0948 
0.15 892 6.50 1.4908 30000 416 0.44 0.0993 
0.2 1282 11.49 2.6353 35000 510 0.51 0.1151 
Table 10. The probability of reinsured surplus process to go negative in case of excess of loss contract 
with net profit variance minimization approach applied 
When the threshold is increasing the ruin probability behaves the same way in both cases, 
however the range of alteration differs depending on the initial parameter inducing the growth 
of the threshold 𝑀. The increase of loading factor, similarly to the utility approach case, 
implies significant growth of ruin probability, namely for 𝜉 twice bigger than the direct 
insurer’s loading factor 𝜑 the ruin probability of the average reinsured process exceeds the 
respective parameter of the original process for more than two times, proving that the 
reinsurer’s loading factor is the determinative parameter when evaluating the reasonableness 
of purchasing the reinsurance cover.  
In case when the cedent enlarge the target level of the net revenue the increasing threshold 
stipulates the growth of the ruin probability of reinsured process, however the computed 
probabilities remain smaller than the one of the non-reinsured process, due to the fact that as 
the reinsurer’s premium loading remains equal to the cedent’s the retained premium depends 
only on 𝑀,  therefore the probability that the total claim amount will exceed the volume of 
premium kept by insurer stays relatively small.  
Hence, the decision concerning setting the non-proportional reinsurance agreement should 
consider two main conclusions derived from the results of simulations, namely: 
− the excess of loss treaty may potentially induce the ruin of the surplus process in case 
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the reinsurer’s premium loading is higher than the one the cedent is using, since the price of 
reinsurance cover represented by the premium asked by the reinsuring party is high, 
consequently the reinsurance agreement appears to be unreasonable from the perspective of 
the ruin probability; 
− nevertheless, if the cedent aims to reduce the variance of the surplus process and 
ensure the prevention of significant losses, the underlying risks should be reinsured up to 
some extent, since the lower is the threshold the less variable are possible terminal surplus 
amount by the end of the insurance period. 
Consequently, the implementation of an excess of loss treaty requires thorough comparison of 
the expected outcomes of purchasing the reinsurance cover under specified parameters with 
the operational goals fixed by the cedent, since the non-proportional treaty introduce a double 
effect on the insurer’s performance: higher lower limit of direct insurer’s responsibility 
certainly reduce the variance of possible financial result, however the ruin probability may 
increase due to the higher price paid for the reinsurance coverage.  
3.4. The Comparison of Risk Process Paths under the Investigated Methodologies 
To make the final conclusion regarding the effectiveness of examined methodologies it terms 
of the direct insurer’s risk process, the comparison between the surplus path in non-
reinsurance case and under two investigated types of contracts with two different retention 
estimation methodologies applied can be performed. 
 
Figure 9: Individual reinsured trajectories 𝑅!!! ,𝑅!!!   and 𝑅!, 𝑗 = 1,2,… , 𝑘, under utility 
approach 
Figure 10: Individual reinsured trajectories 𝑅!!! ,𝑅!!!and 𝑅!, 𝑗 = 1,2,… , 𝑘, under variance 
minimization approach (𝜉 = 𝜂 = 0.1,𝛼 = 0.2, 𝑐 = 30000) 
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Hence, under the specified conditions application of both optimization methodologies proved 
that the quota share reinsurance treaty performs better, due to the fact that in average the 
original surplus process maintains the growing tendency and the proportional reinsurance 
cover certainly retains the particular proportion of the positive trend equal to the retention 
rate. 
The excess of loss treaty under the specified set of determinative parameters generally ensures 
the cedent against excessive losses and lower the probability of negative financial outcome, 
however it should be considered that the non-proportional treaty may induce increase of 
insurer’s ruin probability even in case of the slight growth of the price of reinsurance cover.  
Generally, the average expected terminal values of surplus paths under all analyzed types of 
reinsurance treaties and retention estimation approaches over 𝑘 iterations have the following 
order in terms of their absolute value: 𝐸 𝑅!!! > 𝐸 𝑅!!! > 𝐸 𝑅!!! > 𝐸 𝑅!!! . 
Since the utility approach applied to quota share agreement provides the highest average 
return, it can be concluded that considering the assumed parameters of the cedent’s risk 
process the given methodology is more reasonable, due to the fact that in general risk process 
is expected to maintain positive slope and therefore higher cession rates implied by the 
variance minimization approach ensure higher share of revenue retained by the direct insurer, 
i.e. its higher profitability. However, in practice the application of the utility optimization 
technique raises the question of the utility function to be chosen for the derivation of the 
retention parameter, requiring additional thorough investigation. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
The optimal retention level being a principal parameter of the reinsurance treaty requires 
derivation of specific numerical approaches to its estimation followed by detailed analysis of 
possible outcomes of the application of the determined cession rates in practice. The given 
problem appears to be complex as different types of reinsurance agreements may influence 
direct insurer’s financial performance in various ways, not necessarily ensuring cedent’s 
solvency. Therefore, the aim of this thesis was to investigate the reinsurance techniques both 
in terms of their mathematical formulation and through their impact on the financial 
performance of the direct insurer, considering that the optimization of reinsurance agreement 
involves two layers of the decision making procedure: choosing the type of agreement and the 
selection of the retention estimation methodology to determine the scope of reinsurance cover 
under the settled contract. 
The share of risk retained within the direct insurer's responsibility in case of a particular type 
of treaty can be estimated using several methodologies, each aiming to fulfill certain objective 
of insurer's performance and consequently appealing to different mathematical concepts. Two 
examined approaches, the utility and net profit variance minimization methodologies, 
stipulate complete algorithms of defining of retention rates. Under both techniques the share 
of retained risk (or threshold) is mathematically formulated on the basis of performed 
derivation procedures, each taking particular target from the cedent's perspective as a starting 
point. Namely maximizing the cedent's wealth by the end of period in case of utility approach 
and minimizing the variance of expected net revenue under the second methodology are 
settled as goals, which should be fulfilled in case of each type of reinsurance agreement 
executed.  
The principal difference between the possible proportional and non-proportional treaties, 
independently of the methodology of retention level estimation is that in case of the first type 
of contract settled the incurred claims will be reduced proportionally to the retention rate 
securing the direct insurer from losses in the respective share. However, under the non-
proportional agreement the reduction of losses is not guaranteed, since in some specific cases 
setting an excess of loss agreement followed by the transfer of determined premium amount 
to reinsurer increase the risk of disparity of retained premium quantity and total amount of 
incurred claims retained under the cedent’s responsibility. 
The obtained simulation results have proved that the scope of the reinsurance cover may 
influence the cedent’s performance differently depending on the type of settled contract and 
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the primary conditions of the reinsurance operations. In this aspect the pattern of influence of 
the initial parameters determining the retention level of the proportional reinsurance 
agreement under both approaches is straightforward, inducing the reasonable alterations of the 
cession rate and consequently proportional shift of the original surplus path within the quota 
share contract. 
However, in case of non-proportional agreement the optimization of the threshold as a key 
parameter of the reinsurance contract appears to be heavily dependent on the initial conditions 
under which the contract is settled. The retention limit in this case may have a dual impact on 
the cedent’s financial results, since the modeled risk process has a more complex relation with 
both the initial factors implying the particular level of reinsurance cover and the parameter of 
reinsurance agreement as a final result of optimization procedure. Thus the expected 
outcomes of direct insurer’s activity with the reinsurance treaty applied may vary 
considerably due to the changing underlying parameters. 
Consequently, from the simulation of the cedent’s surplus process it follows that the change 
of premium loading factor of the reinsuring party representing the price of the purchased 
cover, followed by the respective shift of the threshold, stipulates the expected alterations in 
the cedent’s final financial outcomes different from the changes induced by parameters other 
than the reinsurance loading rate. Therefore, the estimation of the reasonable retention 
parameter of the non-proportional reinsurance treaty involves the indeed complex analysis of 
the outstanding factors of insurer’s activity, their impact on the reinsurance parameter and the 
expected outcomes resulting from the specified conditions of the agreement. Since the correct 
evaluation of the retention limit directly impacts the riskiness of the company’s operations, 
the choice of the scope of the reinsurance cover should follow from the objectives settled by 
the direct insurer with respect to estimated expected outcomes induced by the selected 
parameter of the reinsurance agreement.  
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